by dp2013 » Thu Dec 26, 2013 2:00 pm
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
CONSUMER CASE NO. 296 OF 2012
1. Shri NITIN MALIK & 52 ORS.,
S/o late Shri Balwan Singh Malik, R/o Flat No. 6065, GH-7, Crossing Republic, Dundahera,
GHAZIABAD.
...........Complainant(s)
Versus
1. STATE OF HARYANA & 2 ORS.,
Through its Secretary, M/o Housing & Urban Development, Changigarh Secretariat,
CHANDIGARH.
2. The Director General Town & Country Planning -Haryana,
Town & Country Planning Department, Sector 18,
CHANDIGARH.
3. M/s Piyush Buildwell India Ltd., Through its Chairman-cum- Managing Director,
Mr Anil Goel, A-16/B-1, Mohan Coop. Industrial Estate, Main Mathura Road,
NEW DELHI - 110044.
...........Opp.Party(s)
BEFORE:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER
HON'BLE MR. DR. S.M. KANTIKAR, MEMBER
For the Complainant : Ms. Madhu Tewatia , Advocate
For the Opp.Party : For Opposite Party Nos. 1 & 2 : NEMO
For Opposite Party No. 3 : Mr. Rakesh Tiku, Sr. Advocate
With Mr. Ankur Bansal &
Mr. Gupinder, Advocates
Dated : 02 Dec 2013ORDER
JUSTICE J.M. MALIK 1. This case was filed in this Commission on 08.11.2012, i.e., more than a year has elapsed. It came up for hearing before us on 29.01.2013. The case was admitted and parties were directed to file written version within four weeks. It was also ordered that tatus quo be maintained. On 05.04.2013, OP 3, Piyush Buildwell India Ltd., moved an application for modification of tatus quo and notice was given for 12.04.2013. However, arguments were heard on 15.04.2013 and the order was modified on 15.04.2013 and matter was adjourned to 09.07.2013. 2. OP 3 was served on 06.02.2013. OP Nos. 1 & 2 were served on 05.11.2013 as per the nodal delivery office, Chandigarh. OP Nos. 1 & 2, are proceeded against ex-parte. They have not filed written version within the prescribed time. 3. This is an admitted fact that OP No.3 did not file the written statement within the prescribed period. OP No.3 has moved an application for condonation of delay (IA No.6300 of 2013). The following averments have been made. Several allegations have been made against the OP No.3, in the complaint. OP No.3 had to consult and trace out the records which took considerable time. Allegations concerning Government compliances were made and record was to be traced out. OP 3 had to hire the services of various professionals/persons in the field of construction to factually deal with the allegation of the complainants regarding the construction and completion of the project in question. The complainants have also initiated criminal proceedings. The Directors had to attend the criminal proceedings, therefore, they could not brief their Advocates with actual facts and circumstances, as also the back-ground facts of this matter. This constitutes sufficient cause. It is the discretion of the Commission to condone the delay as per Topline Shoes Ltd., Vs. Corporation Bank, (2002) 6 SCC 33, decided by two JudgesBench of the Apex Court. 4. The above said application was contested by the complainants. 5. We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused their written submissions. The learned counsel for OP3 vehemently argued that Topline Shoes Ltd. (Supra) is directly applicable to this case. He has also placed reliance on Kailash Vs. Nankhu & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 480, wherein, the Honle Apex court held : 7. In our opinion, the view of the law so taken by this Court squarely applies to the issue before us and we find ourselves in agreement with the law stated by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Topline Shoes Ltd (supra) 38. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, invited our attention to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Dr.J.J.Merchant & Ors. Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi, (2002) 6 SCC 635, wherein we find a reference made to Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC vide paras 14 and 15 thereof and the Court having said that the mandate of the law is required to be strictly adhered to. A careful reading of the judgment shows that the provisions of Order VIII, Rule1of the CPC did not directly arise for consideration before the Court and to that extent the observations made by the Court are obiter. Also, the attention of the Court was not invited to the earlier decision of this Court in Topline Shoes Ltd case (supra). 41. Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of Order VIII in the present form and the context in which the provision is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has to be construed as directory and not mandatory. In exceptional situations, the court may extend the time for filing the written statement though the period of 30 days and 90 days, referred to in the provision, has expired. However, we may not be misunderstood as nullifying the entire force and impact - the entire life and vigour of the provision. The delaying tactics adopted by the defendants in law courts are now proverbial as they do stand to gain by delay. This is more so in election disputes because by delaying the trial of election petition, the successful candidates may succeed in enjoying the substantial part, if not in its entirety, the term for which he was elected even though he may lose the battle at the end. Therefore, the judge trying the case must handle the prayer for adjournment with firmness. The defendant seeking extension of time beyond the limits down by the provision may not ordinarily be shown indulgence. 42. Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1 has to be honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is served on him, he should take steps for drafting his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his appearance in the Court. The extension of time sought for by the defendant from the court whether within 30 days or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking more so, when the period of 90 days has expired. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the Court to its satisfaction. It must be spelled out that a departure from the time schedule prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code was being allowed to be made because the circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and such extension was required in the interest of justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. 43. A prayer seeking time beyond 90 days for filing the written statement ought to be made in writing. In its judicial discretion exercised on well-settled parameters, the Court may indeed put the defendants on terms including imposition of compensatory costs and may also insist on affidavit, medical certificate or other documentary evidence (depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case) being annexed with the application seeking extension of time so as to convince the Court that the prayer was founded on grounds which do exist. 44. The extension of time shall be only by way of exception and for reasons to be recorded in writing, howsoever brief they may be, by the court. In no case, the defendant shall be permitted to seek extension of time when the court is satisfied that it is a case of laxity or gross negligence on the part of the defendant or his counsel. The court may impose costs for dual purpose: (i) to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for asking and (ii) to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him. 45. However, no straitjacket formula can be laid down except that the observance of time schedule contemplated by Order VIII, Rule 1 shall be the rule and departure therefrom an exception, made for satisfactory reasons only. We hold that Order VIII, Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form, is directory, being a provision in the domain of Procedural law 6. It was also submitted that this view was also followed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Smt. Rani Kusum Vs. Smt. Kanchan Devi & Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 705, Smt. Muneesh Devi Vs. U.P. Power Corporation & ORs., (2013) 9 SCALE 640. 7. We find force in his arguments in a measure. It must be borne in mind that Kailash Vs. Nankhu & Ors., decided by three-JudgesBench, pertains to CPC. This is obiter dictum simplicitor. We are aware of the fact that even the obiter dictum by the Honle Apex Court has to be followed when there is no authority by the Apex Court on similar point by same number of Judges. The Honle Apex court in the authority consisting of three Honle Judges reported in Dr. J.J. Merchant & Ors. (Supra), has held :- .. From the aforesaid section, it is apparent that on receipt of the complaint, the opposite party is required to be given notice directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum or the Commission. For having speedy trial, this legislative mandate of not giving more than 45 days in submitting the written statement or the version of the case is required to be adhered to. If this is not adhered, the legislative mandate of disposing of the cases within three or five months would be defeated. 8. The above cited authorities pertain to Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC. It must be assumed that the procedure laid down in CPC cannot be equated with the procedure laid down in CP Act, 1986. CP Act has a different kind of procedure. To top it all, it is a summary procedure. Secondly, and most importantly, time has been prescribed for disposal of the case or appeal or revision. A complaint has to be decided within 180 days. If OP is permitted to file the written version within 180 days or more than 180 days, the very purpose and object of CP Act shall stand defeated. The observations made in Dr. J.J. Merchant & Ors. (supra) are relevant and this Commission is bound to follow the same. 9. Dr.J.J. Merchant & Ors., (supra) was followed in Fair Growth Investment Ltd. Vs. Custodian 92004) 11 SCC 472, wherein it was held that : 6. The decision which does deal with this question is Topline Shoes Ltd. Vs. Corporation Bank. The subject matter of interpretation in that case was Section 13(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides that a person opposing the complaint under the Act was required to file an answer to the complaint ithin a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days, as may be granted by the District Forum The Court took into account the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and came to the conclusion that the period of extension of time ot exceeding fifteen days was directory in nature and was an expression of esirability in strong terms While expressing our reservation about the correctness of the view expressed in Topline Shoes Ltd., it is not necessary for us to expatiate on such reservation in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in Dr.J.J.Merchant case by a larger Bench, in which the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act were also construed. The Court categorically held that the outer period of 45 days to submit an answer of a complaint had to be adhered to strictly. Given the view expressed by a larger Bench, it would not be appropriate for us to proceed on the opinion expressed earlier by a smaller Bench in Topline Shoes. (See in this connection Union of India Vs. K.S. Subramanian). We are therefore of the view that the period for filing an objection in Section 4(2) in the Act is a mandatory provision given the language of the Section and having regard to the objects sought to be served by the Act 10. We have been taking this view, recently, in various cases. The Apex court upheld, this view, in petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.24705/2013, in the case titled, The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Rajankumar & Bros (IMPEX), decided on 13.08.2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP, on first hearing. 11. The Apex court, again, in Kamal Prit Palta & Anr., Vs. Vikas Rana & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 4806-4807 of 2013, for preliminary hearing, decided on 12.07.2013, was pleased to pass the following order :- eard learned counsel for the appellants. He submits that the National Commission should not have declined to take the written statement of the appellant on record merely for the reason of delay. The National Commission has relied upon a judgment of three Judges of this Court in Dr. J.J. Merchant & ORs., Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 635. The counsel submits that he has applied for review and that review application bearing No.RA 216 of 2013, is also rejected. He, however, states that the appellant is prepared to deposit half of the amount of the claim which is filed by the respondent. In view of the death of the concerned patient, the amount claimed is one crore and sixty lakhs. Since there are two respondents, we permit the appellants to deposit Rs.83,00,000/- (rupees eighty-three lakhs) in the National Commission before the next date of hearing, which is 19.09.2013. The counsel states that after the amount is so deposited, in the National Commission, he will apply to the National Commission for revival of the review application by filing another application for that purpose. It will be for the National Commission thereafter to consider whether the application should be entertained or not. It will be open to the National Commission to take appropriate decision on facts as well as in law. The appeals stand disposed of 12. In next case, the Apex court, reported in Unitech Ltd. Vs. Sanjay Goyal & Ors., Civil Appeal No.6042 of 2013, has ordered, he appeal is dismissed as withdrawn, in terms of the signed order as on 08.08.2013 The order, further reads :- his appeal is directed against order dated 29.05.2013, passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, in Consumer Complaint No.344 of 2012. After arguing the case for some time, Shri Abhimanyu Bhandari, learned counsel for the appellant made a request that his client may be permitted to withdraw the appeal. The request of the learned counsel is accepted and the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn. It is needless to say that the appellant shall have to implement the directions contained in the impugned order, within the time specified therein. A copy of this order be sent to the respondents by registered post at the address mentioned in the Memo of Appeal. Sd/- G.S.Singhvi, J Sd/- J.Mukhopadhaya, J 13. For all these reasons, we hereby dismiss the application for condonation of delay in filing the written version. The written version will not be read in evidence. The case is now fixed for arguments on another IA, for Complainant evidence by way of affidavit and for final arguments, on 18.12.2013.
......................J
J.M. MALIK
PRESIDING MEMBER
......................
DR. S.M. KANTIKAR
MEMBER